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THE THREAT OF THE WANDERING POOR:
WELFARE PAROCHIALISM AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE USE OF HOUSING,




At best, income and housing programs for poor people run on
parallel tracks. Although reformers of the Progressive era saw bad
housing and urban poverty as fatally meshed,' the nationalized
housing goals2 and nationalized income policy 3 developed during
the New Deal shared little except their status as responses to the
economic catastrophe of the Great Depression. That present-day
commentators treat as novel the notion that federal housing policy
might be part of a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy under-
scores the divergence between what we think of as poverty pol-
* Professor of Law and Director, Public Interest Law Clinic, Washington Col-
lege of Law of the American University. The author wishes to thank Robert P.
Gajdys, Ruth Crystal, Barbara Samuels, Jane Conover and John Goering for provid-
ing valuable background and materials; Sheila O'Leary for her research assistance;
and the Washington College of Law for its support.
1. See, e.g., JACOB RIIs, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES 2-3 (1957): "What the
tenements are and how they grow to what they are, we shall see hereafter .... they are
the hot-beds of the epidemics that carry death to rich and poor alike; the nurseries of
pauperism and crime that fill our jails and police courts; that throw off a scum of forty
thousand human wrecks to the island asylums and workhouses year by year .... "; see
also CHARLES HOCH AND ROBERT A. SLAYTON, NEW HOMELESS AND OLD 62-64
(1989).
2. See ROBERT FISHER, ORIGINS OF FEDERALLY AIDED PUBLIC HOUSING IN
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS, PAST AND PRESENT 231 (1985); RACHEL
G. BRATT, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE CONTROVERSY AND CONTRIBUTION IN CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 335 (Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartman, Ann Meyerson
eds., 1986). For a capsule history of federal rental housing programs, including the
post World War II adoption of numerical goals for housing construction, see Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met? 71
N.C.L. REV. 1619, 1621-1626 (1993).
3. For contemporary and subsequent accounts of the genesis of the Social Secur-
ity Act of 1935, see EDITH ABBOTr, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (1940); WINIFRED BELL,
AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965); FRANCES Fox PIVEN AND RICHARD
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1971); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTI-
TLED - SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994).
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icy-the structure and administration of cash benefits and other
income support systems-and housing policy for poor people.4
Income maintenance and assisted housing, as the two dominant
governmental poverty programs, are on a collision course. This
collision appears even more likely when the federal housing pro-
gram at issue is the tenant-based subsidy,5 and when the federal
housing poverty goal is mobility.6 This Essay discusses how, if one
accepts the premises of mobility-based anti-poverty strategies,7 the
geographical parochialism and structural rigidity of the welfare sys-
tem undermine mobility goals.
The Essay also examines the possibility that current trends in
housing policy will undercut anti-poverty goals. The first federal
housing program focused on subsidizing persons with limited, but
earned, income.8 Only relatively recently has legislation put fed-
4. See, e.g., Florence Roisman and Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Op-
portunities, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335 (1993). See also Michael A. Stegman, Na-
tional Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C.L.REv. 1737, 1766-7 (1993) (commenting on
bureaucratic reasons for the lack of cooperation among federal agencies responsible
for implementing poverty policies).
5. "Tenant-based" refers to the more recently created federal Section 8 Existing
Housing Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 24 C.F.R. §§ 882, 982
(1994) and the Housing Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (1988 & Supp. V
1993), 24 C.F.R. §§ 887, 982 (1994), which subsidize rents so that tenants pay a per-
centage of their income in order to rent in the private sector. "Project-based" pro-
grams include the original conventional public housing program of the United States
Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 24 C.F.R. § 912
(1994). For a summary of the major federal housing programs, see Fred Fuchs, Intro-
duction to HUD Conventional Public Housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher,
and Subsidized Housing Programs, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 782 (1991)(Part I: Con-
ventional Housing); 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 990 (1991)(Part II: Section 8 Existing
Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing). For a brief history of federal project-
based and tenant-based subsidies, see JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM AND RICHARD P. Ap-
PELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 74-80 (1988).
6. "Mobility" refers to the use of a flexible subsidy to enable a tenant to move
away from areas of concentrated poverty, and, inferentially, from a dearth of employ-
ment and educational opportunity. See, e.g., GEORGE E. PETERSON AND KALE WIL-
LIAMS, HOUSING MOBILITY: WHAT HAS IT ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT Is ITS
PROMISE? (Pre-Conference Paper for First National Conference on Housing Mobility
as an Anti-Poverty Strategy, Oct. 1994).
7. 8. For a leading challenge to the exclusively integrationist premises underly-
ing mobility strategies, see John Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commis-
sion Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C.L.REv. 1486, 1494-5 (1993).
8. See ROBERT FISHER, Origins of Federally Aided Public Housing, in FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS, PAST AND PRESENT 231, 232-6 (J. Paul Mitchell ed.,
1985)(describing the antecedents of federal housing programs as being the federally
financed construction of housing for employees of the defense industry during World
War I, as well as the creation in 1932 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the
first federal agency to finance private sector housing for any tenant regardless of the
tenant's source of income).
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eral housing dollars into service for the benefit of the very poor.9
Yet, even as the gap grows between rising private market rents and
eroding public welfare benefits, federal housing policy is reverting,
once again, to favor tenants who are employed and who are local.
This movement away from housing those with the greatest need
resonates with proposals to eliminate income supports for those
least able to support themselves in the private economy.
H. Mobilization Strategies in the Face of Parochialism in Public
Assistance Poliies
A. The "Spatialization"'10 of Visible Poverty-Past and Present
Americans show extraordinary ambivalence about mobility. It is
at once treasured and feared: treasured as an attribute and enabler
of personal autonomy, feared as a characteristic of the unpredict-
able and uncontrollable stranger.1 Fear of the transient has moti-
vated key elements of our social policy, from the awarding of
public assistance to the physical and intellectual containment of the
visible, begging poor.
12
Social policy excludes the wandering visible poor in at least three
ways: through the denial of assistance, through physical segrega-
tion, and through the criminalization of transience. Eighteenth
century communities in colonial North America controlled expend-
itures for poor relief by screening for residency, not for eligibility;
assistance was given casually as an incident of membership in the
9. See RACHEL G. BRATr, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 335, 339 (Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartman, Ann
Meyerson eds., 1986)(explaining how public housing rent limits were imposed by the
1949 National Housing Act to remove public housing from competition with the pri-
vate housing industry).
' 10. Austin Sarat used the term "spatialized" to describe poor people whose
insecurity is both symbolized and concretely reinforced by their confinement in the
waiting room of the offices where they seek benefits. Austin Sarat, "... The Law is
All Over": Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE HUMANITIES 343, 360 (1990). I use the term
"spatialization" first, to capture the preoccupation in American poverty policy with
controlling the geographical location of poor people and, second, to evoke the related
process of "spatial isolation." Spatial isolation is the term used by Douglas Massey
and Nancy Denton to describe how private and public attitudes and policies combine
to sequester African-Americans physically. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS 83 (1993).
11. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L. REV. 637, 638 (1991).
12. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment
and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 910-911 (1991)(on the spatialization by
the non-poor of the visible poor).
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community. To be "deserving" meant to be local; ties to the neigh-
borhood sufficed as a voucher for credibility. Strangers without lo-
cal ties were simply "warned oUt,"'1 3 a practice that continued into
the twentieth century. 4 In addition to, or in place of, warning out
statutes, states throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies constructed elaborate schemes for the enforcement of obli-
gations among counties that provided reciprocal reimbursement
for the public care of non-resident indigents, including the costs of
medical care, lodging and burial.'
5
The second expedient, the use of "indoor relief," the practice of
confining the able-bodied indigent in poorhouses or workhouses,
proved to be expensive and administratively chaotic. Poorhouses
suffered from managerial difficulties in staffing and budgeting. In
addition, theoretical conflicts over whether rehabilitation or pun-
ishment was the proper mission of the poorhouse translated into
additional problems in programmatic implementation. As a result,
the practice of institutionalizing poor people did not expand signifi-
cantly past its implementation earlier in the century in the north-
eastern cities and areas of the South.'
16
The last, perhaps most common, means of isolating nonindige-
nous poverty was to criminalize it. Nineteenth century Americans
were obsessed with "tramps" and attributed to them all manner of
property despoliation, violent crime and moral degeneration. 7
Particularly during the labor unrest of the 1870s, fear of tramps
13. "Warning out" is the practice of disclaiming financial responsibility for unde-
sired newcomers by giving them a pro forma "warning" not to remain. See JOSIAH H.
BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND (1911). See also DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC 22-29 (1971); Douglas L. Jones, The Strolling Poor: Transience in Eighteenth
Century Massachusetts, 8 J. Soc. HIST. 28 (1974-5); Gary & Nash, Urban Wealth and
Poverty in Pre-Revolutionary America, 6 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 545,562 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Lucht v. Bell, 8 N.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Minn. 1943) (finding that plaintiffs
are not "poor persons" subject to removal under state's warning-out statute).
15. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 21 (1986)(noting
that "Towns often spent more money ridding themselves of paupers than they would
have spent supporting them"); see, e.g., The Inhabitants of Bridgewater v. The In-
habitants of Dartmouth, 4 Mass. Reports 273 (1808)(adjudicating whether the town bf
Bridgewater was estopped from claiming reimbursement for the maintenance of a
mother and her three children, and for funeral expenses for one child, and for mainte-
nance and funeral expenses of another "pauper," as a result of Bridgewater's imper-
fect notice to Dartmouth of the presence of these alleged residents of Dartmouth in
Bridgewater).
16. For descriptions of the administration of poorhouses and of the contempora-
neous debates over their efficacy in controlling poverty, see ROTHMAN,SUpra note 14,
at 180-205 (1971); KATZ, supra note 16 at 3-35, 85-109 (1986).
17. Friedman, supra note 12 at 657.
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served as code for fear of the unemployed and promoted two de-
velopments: the widespread enactment of particularly vicious anti-
vagrancy legislation and the retraction of public cash relief.'8 In
addition to criminalizing the poor directly, states imposed penalties
upon anyone transporting persons likely to become public
charges. 19 Our modem "right to travel" jurisprudence, as it has
affected the ease with which poor people may change residency
and apply for public assistance, began with the voiding of Califor-
nia's "Okie" statute, which criminalized the in-state importation of
any indigent persons who subsequently applied for relief.20 In the
course of ruling that such statutes impermissibly burdened inter-
state commerce, 21 the Supreme Court noted the influence on legis-
lation of the perception of "the spectacle of large segments of our
population constantly on the move .... ,
Modem containment strategies for visible poverty echo these
historical precedents. The actual or constructive denial of relief to
new residents, a feature exacerbated by regional variations in pay-
ment amounts and services, re-emerges as such a significant factor
in current reformulations of welfare programs that this Essay ad-
dresses it in a separate section.23 States and municipalities have re-
invented policies that exclude poor people from the polity, either
through actual physical containment or through banishment. De-
spite the history of fiscal and administrative problems of indoor
relief, the ideological appeal of controlling the movement of the
poor was powerful enough for the program to re-emerge in the
1980s in the form of compelled institutional placements for general
relief recipients. 24 Commentators describe such "shelterization" of
18. See MICHAEL DAVIS, Forced to Tramp: The Perspective of the Labor Press,
1870-1900, in WALKING TO WORK: TRAMPS IN AMERICA, 1790-1935 at 141, 161-2
(Eric H. Monkkonen, ed., 1984)(noting resemblance of anti-tramp laws to southern
"black codes," and giving as examples Connecticut's offering of bounties for turning
in tramps, and Ohio's enactment of mandatory three year jail terms for lighting fires
or entering yards).
19. See 41 AM. Jut., "Poor and Poor Laws," Section 28, "Transient and Unsettled
Paupers;" see, e.g., Risner v. State ex rel. Martin, 9 N.E.2d 151 (1936)(imposition of
fine as civil penalty for the transport of indigent person into county or township).
20. See generally Stephen Loffredo, "If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Com-
merce Clause and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
147 (1993)(describing the history of the construction of the Commerce Clause which
invalidates durational residency requirements for the receipt of benefits).
21. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
22. Id. at 173.
23. See infra part II.B.2.
24. General relief, general assistance, and home relief programs descend directly
from the scattered municipal outdoor relief programs of the nineteenth century. As a
1995] 1211
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homeless persons as both a process and a consequence of putting
homeless people out of sight. 25 A recent survey noted thirteen in-
stances of municipal restrictions on the public presence of home-
less people.26 These restrictions are manifest in (i) the enactment
of new ordinances prohibiting activities that homeless people must
perform in public, such as sleeping27 and, (ii) the intensified,
targeted enforcement of existing trespassing and traffic ordinances
against street people.28 For example, the U.S. district court in Pot-
category, general assistance refers to state or locally operated programs of cash assist-
ance to individuals who are unable to qualify for any other benefit. For descriptions
of the history of general assistance in two individual states, see Louis Rosenberg,
Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the Indiana Township Assist-
ance System, 6 IND. L. REV. 336 (1973); Kerry R. Bensinger, From Public Charity to
Social Justice: The Role of the Courts in California's General Relief Program, 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 497 (1988). For programs that required institutionalization as a condition
of receiving cash benefits, see Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695 (Cal.
1985)(finding invalid under state statutory welfare law, and state constitutional pri-
vacy law, Sacramento County's replacement of its cash program with monitored dor-
mitory living, with curfews and restrictions on visitors); Bedford v. Sugarman, 772
P.2d 486 (Wash. 1989)(upholding Washington state's program to require General
Assistance recipients with drug and alcohol dependencies to live in controlled
shelters).
25. See Louisa R. Stark, The Shelter as "Total Institution," 37 Am. BEHAVIORAL
SCIEN'rIST 553, 560 (1994)(identifying shelters for homeless people with "total institu-
tions," which exist in part to segregate persons perceived to pose a threat to the ex-
isting social order); Jeffrey Grunberg and Paula F. Eagle, Shelterization: How the
Homeless Adapt to Shelter Living, 41 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 521
(1990)(describing residents' self-destructive adaptations to physically dangerous and
psychologically destabilizing conditions in a large New York City shelter).
26. NAT'L L. CENT. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, No Homeless People Al-
lowed: A Report on Anti-Homeless Laws, Litigation and Alternatives in 49 United
States Cities, Table I - Enactment or Enforcement of Anti-Homeless Policies or Laws
in 1994 (Dec. 1994).
27. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1441, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1994)(up-
holding enactment of city ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on public sidewalks in
business districts during certain hours); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
386, 395 (Cal. App. 1994)(invalidating recent enactment of "camping ordinance," and
also finding a pattern in previous municipal actions of a concerted campaign of har-
assment against homeless people, id. at 387-390), rev'd 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 402 (1995);
Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Texas 1994)(striking city ordinance
which prohibited public sleeping, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment). .
28. See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846 (N.D. Cal.
1994)(describing San Francisco's "matrix program," of concerted enforcement against
public drinking, obstruction, littering, public sleeping, and public defecation/urination,
instituted after a report by the mayor's office attributing to the public presence of
homeless people an estimated loss to the city of $173 million in sales). See ROB Ro-
SENTHAL, HOMELESS IN PARADISE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN 1-17 (1994)(describing
history of Santa Barbara's "anti-sleeping" ordinance); see generally Harry Simon,
Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to
Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TuL. L. REV. 631 (1992); Paul
Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleep-
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tinger v. City of Miami 9 ordered the creation of two "safe zones"
within which homeless persons could sleep or eat without fear of
arrest.30 Although the ruling intended to protect homeless persons
from official harassment, it may prove to be just as isolating as the
practices it condemned.
The most powerful rhetoric of spatialization of visibly poor peo-
ple emerges from two major "begging" cases. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Young v. New York City Transit
Authority,31 upheld prohibitions on begging within the Port Au-
thority building, and the New York City subway and commuter rail
systems. The court portrayed a scenario of captive commuters de-
fenseless against predatory panhandlers. The opinion presents a
Piranesian underground world in which commuters must navigate
"steep and long staircases and mechanical escalators to wait on
narrow and crowded platforms bounded by dark tunnels and high
power electrical rails., 32 According to the Court, the presence of
panhandlers, in this already menacing setting, creates personal and
more far-reaching anxiety. An expert for the City described the
commuters' experience with panhandlers in this context as "inher-
ently aggressive. ' 33 In the second case, Loper v. New York City
Police Department,34 the Second Circuit held that begging in an un-
confined area, such as a sidewalk, is a mode of protected speech.
Loper, therefore, limits the state's prerogative in protecting public
safety to confined spaces. Not surprisingly, the same expert who
testified in Young suggested in Loper that begging, even in uncon-
fined public spaces, contributes to the "Broken Windows" effect,36
ing in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595
(1989).
. 29. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded, 88-2406-CIV-CCA (11th Cir.
Dec. 7, 1994).
30. Id. at 1584.
31. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
32. Young, 903 F.2d at 149.
33. Id. at 150 (quoting Professor George Kelling, consultant to the Transit
Authority).
34. See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, (2d Cir. 1993)(finding
that city sidewalks, unlike subway terminals, are public fora, and that begging on city
sidewalks is expressive speech which the state cannot show any sufficiently compelling
interest to regulate), aff'g Loper v. New York City Transit Authority, 802 F. Supp.
1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
35. Id.
36. See, George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANric
MONTHLY, at 29 (Mar. 1982)(arguing that signs of disorder and decay, such as broken
windows in neighborhoods, directly lead to a loss of social order and decay, including
serious crime).
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in which city residents experience begging as one of several threat-
ening indicia of urban decay. 37
The personal insecurity of the city-dweller that so readily associ-
ates the transient stranger with disorder often does not stop at
fear of the panhandler or homeless person.38 Unfortunately, poor
families seeking housing subsidies with the hope of making new
lives in new places, must contend with this fear and other stereo-
types. For example, poor women of color who wish to relocate
encounter the stereotype and public distaste for the "welfare
mother ' 39 and unverified assumptions that poor women moving
into a neighborhood do, in fact, receive public assistance.40
These negative images about the poor are often powerful
enough to contribute to the disruption of entire programs.41
37. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)(paraphrasing Professor Kelling's testimony that the presence of beggars, along
with "broken windows, drug dealers, and youth gangs" signals the onset of urban
disorder), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
38. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, URBAN DANGER: LIFE IN A NEIGHBORHOOD OF
STRANGERS 201 (1981)(chronicling historical European as well as American percep-
tions of urban threat, in the person of the criminal and the "socially marginal"); id. at
237-8 (noting that perception of individuals as rootless or "detached" persons induces
fear of crime).
39. See WAHNEEMA LUBIANO, BLACK LADIES, WELFARE QUEENS, AND STATE
MINSTRELS: IDEOLOGICAL WAR BY NARRATIVE MEANS, IN RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER 323, 338-9 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)(noting popular culture as
holding "welfare queens" responsible for personal and societal degeneration);
Michael Morris & John B. Williamson, Stereotypes and Social Class: A Focus on Pov-
erty, in IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN STEREOTYPING
411, 424-5 (Miller ed., 1982)(finding that imagery of "deficient character and motiva-
tion" predominates when non-poor people think about poor people, especially people
receiving welfare benefits).
40. For example, of the first twenty-eight participants to attend orientation ses-
sions for Baltimore's "Moving to Opportunity" program, twenty-one were receiving
benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and six
were working and receiving no income benefits. Interview with Ruth Crystal, Direc-
tor, Moving to Opportunity Program, Baltimore, Maryland (Dec. 1, 1994)(notes on
file with author).
41. The very recent and explosive community reaction to Moving to Opportunity
in Baltimore, which led to the national curtailment of the Moving to Opportunity
Program (hereafter, MTO), is a complicated story of electoral politics and historic
patterns that exceeds the scope of this essay. Many expressed opposition to, and sup-
port for, the program. A leading opponent, at the time a delegate to the state assem-
bly, made the most publicized, though not necessarily the most representative,
pronouncement against the program: "I'm not discussing race or poverty' but I'm
concerned that they might send out people who have to be taught how to bathe, how
not to steal, and how not to smoke pot." Ed Brandt, Scare Tactics Bring Down Federal
Housing Program, THE SUN (Baltimore), Oct. 30, 1994, at 1B (quoting Louis L.
DePazzo, former Delegate, 7th District, Maryland House of Delegates). See also
H.R. REP. 715, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. at 43-44 (1994)(deferring the entirety of the 1995
budget request for Moving to Opportunity Counseling, citing doubt about the "field
1214
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Fear of the mobile poor only synergizes these already potent
prejudices.42
B. The Modem Welfare Benefits System: Reinforcement of
Localism in a Nationalized System
1. The Persistence of Geographical Boundaries Under the
Current Federal System
In his opinion for the majority in Edwards v. California,43 Justice
Byrne acknowledged the new demographic and political realities of
providing for people in need in a highly mobile nation:
Indeed, the record in this very case illustrates the inadequate
basis in fact for the theory that relief is presently a local mat-
ter. . .. . [I]n not inconsiderable measure the relief of the needy
has become the common responsibility and concern of the
whole nation."
Relying twenty-seven years later on Justice Douglas's concur-
rence in Edwards, the Supreme Court upheld in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son not merely a negative'right to travel free from state-imposed
impediments, but an affirmative right for welfare recipients to con-
sider mobility in making the same assessments about the quality of
life that other Americans do.4 5 The Court's invalidation of one-
year residency requirements for welfare recipients confirmed the
idea of national responsibility, and national access, for welfare.
staff capacity to properly handle the program"). For a general description of goals
and design of the five-city MTO demonstration project, see infra part III.
42. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes
and Antidiscrimination Law, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251, 251-2 (1989)(hypothesiz-
ing that imposition of non-suspect characteristics upon members of suspect class will
result in new vehicles for discrimination against members of the suspect class). In this
instance, neither "welfare" nor "mother" individually is traditionally "suspect;" yet,
powerful *stereotypes associated with each prove extremely stigmatizing when both
are joined. See Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991
DUKE L.J. 274, 284 (1991)(noting the labeling of single mothers as degenerate and
"implicated by their asserted role in the intergenerational transmission of poverty").
43. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
44. Id. at 175.
45. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1968): "But we do not perceive why a
mother who is seeking, to make a new life for herself and her children should be
regarded as less deserving because she considers, among other factors, the level of a
State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving than a mother who
moves into a particular'State in order to take advantage of its better educational facil-
ities." But see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574,
1611-1612 (1987)(noting that arguments before the Court in Shapiro did indeed em-
phasize the hardships posed by the challenged durational residency requirements,
even if the opinion emphasized the commonality between the welfare applicant's and
the middle class person's goals).
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Despite this recognition that an easily accessible national welfare
program is needed, the current structure of welfare preserves the
ancient state-to-state prerogatives, jealousies and inequities.
One such inequity, the most serious and obvious one, is the mo-
bility barrier created by the state-to-state disparity in payment
amounts. State-run and financed general assistance programs-
where they still exist46-differ from state to state, and sometimes
even from county to county. 7 Food stamps48 and Supplemental
Security Income49 are the only major welfare programs with na-
tional standards of payment." The federal-state structure of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, how-
ever, affords states latitude in the area of setting payment levels.5 1
As a result, there are presently huge variations from state to state
in monthly payment levels. 2
While payment differentials conserve state prerogatives, they
also resurrect the same "welfare magnet" 53 fears that precipitated
the criminalization of the traveling poor during the pre-Edwards
era. Thus, although researchers have discredited the theory that
people cross state lines solely to take advantage of more lucrative
46. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, Jobless, Penniless, Often
Homeless: State General Assistance Cuts Leave "Employables" Struggling for Survival
1 (1994)(stating that in 1991-2, four states eliminated their general assistance pro-
grams completely, and ten others curtailed eligibility); Sarah Mulkern, The New Law
Governing Public Assistance, 1 D.C.L. REV. 171 (1993)(describing due process viola-
tions in the replacement of the District of Columbia's general public assistance pro-
gram for incapacitated individuals with a more limited program for persons with
longer-term disabilities).
47. Bensinger, supra note 25 at 500-01 (describing the county-based structure of
California's general relief program); MARION NICHOLS, JON DUNLAP, AND SCOTr
BARKAN, NATIONAL GENERAL ASSISTANCE SURVEY, 1992 at 2-3 (Dec. 1992).
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011-32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. Part 271 -(1994).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1381-85 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 20 C.F.R. Part 416 (1994).
50. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK 768-9 (1994)[hereinaf-
ter 1994 GREEN BooK](listing standardized national maximum monthly food stamp
allotments); id. at 217 (noting that the 1994 federal SSI benefit is $446 per month for
an individual, but that some states do supplement the benefit for selected categories
of recipients).
51. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970)(holding that a state may pare down
payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing percent of benefits paid or
by switching to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure actual standards of
need).
52. See, e.g., 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 51 at 375-6 (listing monthly payment
levels for each state for a household of three).
53. The "welfare magnet" theory posits that poor people are willing to move inter-
state to obtain higher welfare benefits.
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welfare packages5 4 these fears motivate states to impose differen-
tial benefits by state of last residency and durational residency re-
quirements in their state-run general relief programs. During the
Bush Administration, states received permission from the federal
government to extend such restrictions to their AFDC programs as
well.56
The Department of Health and Human Services has foresworn
the practice of allowing states to erect such barriers against in-state
migration 7.5  Nonetheless, the increased rate at which the federal
government seems willing to cede discretion to the states under
current welfare law, using the mechanism of the "welfare waiver,"
causes other concerns for mobility over and above the impact of
any proposed substantive changes.5 8 Arguably any major state-to-
state differences in the eligibility criteria for benefits, or the time
54. See, e.g., RUSSELL L. HANSON AND JOHN T. HARTMAN, Do WELFARE MAG-
NETS ATRACT? 14-15 (Inst. for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper no. 1028-94,
Feb. 1994)(finding from analysis of sample from Current Population Surveys that
poor women of child-bearing age are as likely to move to states with low wages and
benefits as to states with high wages and benefits); PAUL E. PETERSON AND MARK C.
ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD 82-3
(1990)(concluding that poor people evaluate welfare benefit levels as they do wage
rates, as one of many factors that may influence migration).
55. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) (invalidating statute that
reduced general assistance benefits for persons who had lived in Minnesota for fewer
than six months), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 902, (1994); Aumick v. Bane, 612 N.Y.S.2d
766 (Sup. Ct. 1994)(invalidating decrease of 20% in home relief benefit for residents
living in the state for fewer than six months). But see Jones vs. Milwaukee County,
485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992) (upholding 60 day residency requirement for general relief
benefits), reh'g denied, 491 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1992).
56. California and Wisconsin received permission through the waiver process to
impose residency restrictions on new applicants for AFDC benefits. Challenges to
these states' plans were upheld or are pending. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp.
516, 521 (E.D. Cal.1993)(holding California's 12 month residency requirement for full
AFDC benefits unconstitutional), aff'd, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted No.
94-197 (Oct. 7, 1994); cert. dismissed, _ U.S. __ 115 S. Ct. 1059 (1995); V.C. v.
Whitburn, Civil Action No. 94-C-1028, Complaint at 9-10 (E.D. Wisc. filed Sept. 12,
1994)(describing § 49.19 (11m), Wis. Stats. (1992-92), which limited payment of
AFDC benefits to new residents of Wisconsin, for their first six months of residence,
to levels received in their previous state of residence).
57. Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994)(state-
ment of Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services).
58. For articles critical of the speed and superficiality of review of states' requests
under 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) to alter key elements of the AFDC
program, see Lucy Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in
Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 8 (1994); Susan Bennett and Kath-
leen Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare "Reform," 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 741 (1993).
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limits within which recipients can continue to receive them, 9 may
make it more difficult for potential recipients to move.
2. Current Proposals Renew Geographic Boundaries
After sixty years of struggling to impose national norms on state-
federal programs of welfare assistance, the trend in today's "wel-
fare reform" is to cede even greater autonomy to the states, even
to the point of allowing them to re-introduce mobility barriers that
it took almost as long to tear down.
Proposed national changes would eliminate the AFDC program,
thereby increasing state-to-state fluctuation.6 ° Specifically, the
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, gives states, the pri-
mary gatekeepers of federal housing assistance, several substantive
options with direct and indirect impacts on mobility. For example,
the bill re-introduces the option of awarding differential welfare
benefits based on the payment level in the state of the applicant's
previous residence.61 One option, that of denying federal subsidies
to families that contain children born out of wedlock to a head of
household under the age of 18,62 clearly impedes mobility and
tramples existing federal housing policy.
63
Plans to devolve the funding and administration of AFDC to the
states pose the greatest disruption to the framework of the federal
public assistance system.64 One advantage of the nationalized
AFDC system is that it imposes procedural uniformity, state to
state and county to county.65 Until recently, the federal govern-
59. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, SUMMARY OF AFDC
WAIVER ACTIVITY SINCE FEBRUARY 1993 9 (1994) (listing states that have received
or are waiting for approval of proposals to limit duration of AFDC benefits. The
proposals vary from conditioning full payment at the end of the term upon recipient's
participation in a work program, to reduction of payment level at the end of the term,
to total termination of payments.)
60. It should be noted that, as of this writing, proposals to change the national
welfare entitlements system are in an extreme state of flux. The author has chosen
H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), as the predominant proposal.
61. H.R. 4, Sec. 101, § 403(c)(2) (1995) ("Authority to treat interstate immigrants
under rules of former State").
62. H.R. 4, Sec. 101, § 405(a)(4)(A) (1995).
63. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.202(b)(4)(i)(A) (1994) [59 Fed. Reg. 36685, July 18, 1994]
(prohibiting the denial of admission to the Section 8 certificate or voucher program
because members of the family include unwed parents or children born out of
wedlock).
64. H.R. 4 replaces the current funding scheme with block grants.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1988) (noting that a state plan under AFDC must
be in effect in every political subdivision of the state); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2)(1988)
(requiring the state to create or designate a single state agency to administer the state
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ment required states to adhere to this over-arching framework, 66
which included guarantees to uniform application procedures 67 and
to due process.68 It is unclear that any plan to return authority for
administration of public assistance to the states would retain any
such uniform protections. At the least, under a patchwork, state-
to-state regime, poor persons seeking to transfer their benefits
cases across state (or even county) lines could encounter delays; at
worst, they would lose their benefits and be forced to re-apply.
3. Other Welfare Barriers to Mobility .
Several other elements of the current federal system hinder fam-
ilies' mobility, either by failing to equip them to move to more de-
sirable jurisdictions or by failing to assist them in implementing
their goals should they succeed in moving. In the present system,
for example, benefits decrease with increases in income.69 Even
with these reductions, should wage-earners manage to put money
away, ceilings on the accumulation of resources limit families' abil-
ity to conserve funds for moving and security deposit expenses.7 °
States have requested and received waivers of these limits in order
to allow recipients to retain more income from employment and to
AFDC plan); 45 C.F.R. § 205.100 (1994) (on administration of the single state'
agency).
66. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (finding that states must conform their
practices in distributing federal AFDC benefits to the requirements set forth in the
Social Security Act); see also the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103, CONG. REC. H10151 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1301-
1320b-13)(preserving the enforceability of the Social Security Act against non-con-
forming provisions of state plans).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A)(1988) (requiring states to allow all individuals
who wish to apply for AFDC to do so).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1988).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(II)(1988) (limiting the "disregards," or deduc-
tions, from earned income of AFDC recipients to $30 plus one-third of the remaining
income for the first four consecutive months of employment during the period of
AFDC receipt; eliminating the one-third disregard after the fourth month; and elimi-
nating the $30 after the eighth month). See also 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 51, at
330 (calculating monthly benefits after computing disregards from earned income
under the 1981, 1984 and 1988 revisions to the AFDC income disregards formulae).
70. 73. 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(7)(B)(1990) (setting ceiling of $1000 for accruable re-
sources); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i)(B) (1994) (setting a thousand dollar resource
limit for each recipient household, and a fifteen hundred dollar limit on equity value
of any automobile); Mercado v. Commissioner of Income Maintenance, 607 A.2d
1142, 1146 (Conn. 1992) (interpreting the Social Security Act and regulations to class-
ify accumulated students' earnings as "resources" and included in earned income);
Hazard v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding $1500 vehicle exclusion);
Champion v. Shalala, 33 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the $1500 vehicle
exclusion).
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keep more savings.71 Nonetheless, no state system of "income dis-
regards" currently in place totally eliminates impediments to
saving.
Moreover, structures theoretically in place to increase welfare
recipients' marketability and, as a corollary, increase their ease of
mobility, do not serve most of their eligible populations. The "Jobs
Opportunities and Basic Skills" program (JOBS), the linchpin of
the present federal work requirement for welfare recipients, man-
dates that states (i) enter into individualized work plans with recip-
ients,72 (ii) operate at least four work or work readiness
programs, 73 and (iii) guarantee child care to program partici-
pants.74 Few welfare recipients are exempted from the program,75
making it an expensive program for states to run. Furthermore,
the goals of the program seem modest to the point of undercutting
true training for economic mobility. For instance, the states are
only required as a part of obligatory educational services to pro-
vide GED equivalents, or remedial reading to a literacy level of
grade 8.9;76 states may in fact restrict post-secondary education or
training,77 an option that the absence of federal reimbursement for
self-initiated education encourages.78 In practice, states are unable
to pay for supportive services, such as daycare, and as a result the
71. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, SUMMARY OF AFDC
WAIVER ACTIVITY SINCE FEBRUARY 1993 7-8 (1994) (listing states with approved or
pending requests for waiver of present regulatory requirements, to allow more gener-
ous treatment of earnings and resources).
72. See The Family Support Act of 1988, Part F - Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills Training Program, 102 Stat. 2343, 2360 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 681 (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§ 682(b)(1)(A-B) (1988) (requiring the state plan to provide for an assessment of the
participant's employability, training needs, and needs for supportive services, and to
work with the participant to develop an "employability plan" based on that
assessment).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 682 (d)(1)(A)(i) (1988), 45 C.F.R. § 250.44 (1994)(requiring states
to offer at least remedial education, job skills training, job readiness training, and job
development and job placement). States must also offer two of four additional serv-
ices, consisting of group and individual job search, on the job training, work supple-
mentation [reservation of AFDC payments for subsidized jobs, see 42 U.S.C. § 682(e)
(1988)], and community work experience programs [unpaid placement in public ser-
vice projects, see 42 U.S.C. § 682(f) (1988)], 42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), 45
C.F.R. § 250.45 (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 602(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 45 C.F.R.
§ 250.30(b)(1994) (listing exemptions from JOBS participation).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 250.44 (a)(1,2) (1994).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 250.48(a)(4) (1994).
78. 45 C.F.R. § 250.48(a)(3) (1994).
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program serves few who need it. In fact, as of 1992, JOBS had an
average monthly rate of only 12% participation.79
The effects of the underfunding of the JOBS program percolate
through the housing component of the anti-poverty system. Hous-
ing programs, such as those operating under the Family Self Suffi-
ciency Act, obligate housing authorities to link residents of public
housing or holders of tenant-based subsidies with existing job train-
ing and education programs.80 These programs depend heavily on
the JOBS program. One study of a pre-cursor to the Family Self
Sufficiency program found that underfunding of JOBS seriously
compromised the program's ability to find support services for
their participants.81 Housing authorities may even receive exemp-
tions from operating Family Self Sufficiency programs if they can
certify unavailability of local supportive services, such as JOBS.82
If welfare programs aim to prepare participants for gainful em-
ployment, workfare and phased-in welfare deductions appear to be
enticing solutions. Unfortunately, experience shows that workfare
programs are costly, require long periods of time before achieving
results, and are effective only for certain recipients. 83 Equally dis-
appointing is the present system of phased-in welfare deductions.
79. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JOBS AND JTPA: TRACKING SPENDING,
OUTCOMES, AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 5 (July 1994). See e.g., Dubose v. Bradley,
No. 93-C-496, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1993) (Final Judgment Order 1-2) (describing Illi-
nois' practice of guaranteeing child care only to participants in its JOBS program, and
then its closure of intake into its JOBS program);.id. at 4-5 (permanently enjoining
the state from providing child care support only to those JOBS participants enrolled
in the program prior to its shutdown).
80. The Family Self Sufficiency program is voluntary for tenants, but obligatory
for housing authorities receiving funding for additional public housing units, Section 8
certificates or vouchers during fiscal year 1993. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437u (Supp. V 1993),
24 C.F.R. § 962 (1994) (Public Housing Family Self-Sufficiency Program); 24 C.F.R.
§ 984 (1994) (Section 8 Family Self-Sufficiency Program).
81. See, e.g., J.W. FREES, INGRID GOULD-ELLEN, GRETCHEN LOCKE, DEP'T OF
Hous. & DEV., OPERATION BOOTSTRAP 60-61 (1994) (study of programs in "Opera-
tion Bootstrap," a demonstration project designed by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (hereafter, HUD) to connect subsidized tenants with services to
enhance the tenants' economic independence, showed that serious underfunding of
JOBS programs undercut efforts of Bootstrap personnel to place participants).
82. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 984.105(c)(1)(i) (1994).
83. See FRIEDLANDER AND GUERON, Are High Cost Services More Effective than
Low Cost Services?, in EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 143, 171-5
(Manski and Garfinkel eds., 1992) (finding that in some work to welfare demonstra-
tions, though some participants showed modest gains in earnings, no clear correlation
emerged between the amount spent on training and the record of recipients in leaving
welfare). "Operation Bootstrap" programs which attempted to target the most des-
perately poor participants with the fewest job skills showed only modest success rates;
the discouraging results had sobering implications for private-sector funders, and en-
couraged "creaming," the targeting of services to candidates already primed for the
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While the program may nudge working recipients off the rolls, re-
search indicates no resulting net gain in income or employability.
84
What has worked, according to one study, is to steer participants
toward suburban opportunity. Developed in settlement of litiga-
tion that asserted governmental complicity in the creation and
maintenance of racially segregated public housing, the Gautreaux
85
program is the primary model for the deliberate, orchestrated use
of subsidies to affect mobility throughout a metropolitan area. A
study of a sample of Gautreaux populations who entered the pro-
gram from 1976 to 1988 found that, between participants who used
housing certificates in suburbs and those who used them in more
familiar neighborhoods in the city, suburban tenants who had
never worked before were far more likely than their urban coun-
terparts to be employed. 6 The same study concluded, however,
that the absence of transportation, child care and job skills, com-
pounded by the presence of racial discrimination, remained as im-
pediments.87 These findings suggest that support systems for
welfare recipients may be critical to enabling them to benefit from
the promises of mobility.
Housing and labor market realities-high housing costs, low-
paying entry-level jobs-require sustained commitment to subsi-
dizing housing and services for low-income people.88 Housing pro-
grams, which define "success" as a reduced, not eliminated,
labor market and more likely to show success. See J.W. FREES, ET AL, supra note 84,
at 36.
84. See REBECCA BLANK, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase
Work and Earnings, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 168,
182 (Sheldon Danziger, Gary Sandefur and Daniel Weinberg eds., 1994) (summariz-
ing research as showing that recipients who lost AFDC as a result of earnings from
work showed little or no economic gain as a result of the forced transfer to work).
85. See Leonard Rubinowitz, Metropolitan Public Housing Desegregation Reme-
dies: Chicago's Privatization Program, 12 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 589, 590-611 (1992)
(describing the Gautreaux litigation against the Chicago Housing Authority and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Id. at 611-13 (describing
the informal negotiation between plaintiffs' attorneys and HUD of a metropolitan
remedy based on the use of tenant-based subsidies to move public housing tenants
into areas of lesser minority concentration, and the formalisation of the remedy with
the consent decree (Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). I refer
to programs adopting this model as "Gautreaux programs" and to tenant participants
in this program as "Gautreaux tenants."
86. See Susan J. Popkin, et al., Labor Market Experiences of Low-Income Black
Women in Middle-Class Suburbs: Evidence from a Survey of Gautreaux Program Par-
ticipants, 12 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 556, 567 (1993).
87. Id. at 570.
88. See id. at 571, n.13 (noting that Gautreaux tenants rarely "work their way" off
Section 8, and require long-term housing subsidies).
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reliance on federal housing subsidy, 9 implicitly recognize the ne-
cessity of maintaining long-term supports, with housing as a critical
"stick in the bundle." If the Gautreaux example-one (admittedly
isolated) outcome of a housing mobility strategy-is to be given
any chance for replication, then someone must rethink the cur-
rently fashionable menu of welfare "reforms," disastrously
bounded as they are by geography and time.
HIL Poverty Policies Within the Housing System-The
Creaming of America?
A. Access of the Very Poor to Opportunities Through Housing:
The Federal Preferences System
The welfare system's primary shortcoming is its failure to pay
enough for anyone to live anywhere. 90 Federal housing subsidies
conceal, and in some ways therefore are complicit with, the states'
deliberate under-funding of their "standards of need," 91 a legally
required but largely fictional articulation of what families actually
need to live.92 Housing subsidies, however, supplement the in-
comes of very few welfare recipients: only 21.2% of AFDC recipi-
89. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 984.102 (1994) (stating that the objective of the Family
Self Sufficiency program is "to reduce the dependency of low income families on wel-
fare assistance and on section 8 .... "). See also Anne Shlay, Family Self Sufficiency
and Housing, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 457, 488-9 (emphasizing that housing sub-
sidy is the single biggest factor in economic self Sufficiency, which should not be de-
fined as no longer relying on housing subsidy).
'90. Compare, e.g., the current maximum monthly AFDC benefit for a family of
three in Maryland of $366 with the current HUD fair market rent standard for the
Section 8 Existing Housing program for even a one bedroom apartment in the Balti-
more metropolitan area of $506; see 59 Fed. Reg. 49517 (1994).
91. For an expression of this view, see Barbara Sard, Florence Roisman, and
Chester Hartman, Homeless: A Dialogue on Welfare and Housing Strategies, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 104, 107 (1989) (noting that the Section 8 rental supplements
which tenants receive are in reality income supplements, since they create no new
housing). For the two examples of states court litigation to exploit legislation mandat-
ing a meaningful comparison of the shelter component of a standard of need with
actual AFDC payment levels, see Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v.
Dukakis, 511 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1987); Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y.
1990).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(h)(2)(A-B) (1988) (requiring each state to report the
methodology for calculating its need standard, and to articulate the relationship be-
tween need and payment standards); see 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note.51 at 366-7
(comparing for all jurisdictions, for a family of three, the 185% gross income limit for
application into the AFDC program, the standard of need, maximum AFDC and
Food Stamp grants, and combined benefits and AFDC alone as percentages of the
federal poverty guideline.. For example, Maryland's $366 monthly grant equals 72 %
of the state's standard of need ($507), and 38% of the poverty guideline.)
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ents are housed in public housing or use federal subsidies. 93 It is
not that households using federal housing subsidies are rich: fewer
than 5% of all participants in federally subsidized housing have in-
comes exceeding the "very low income" standard that controls ad-
mission into the voucher program. 94 The disparity between the
population of persons receiving income supports and the popula-
tion of persons receiving housing supports simply underscores the
restrictiveness of eligibility for welfare.
This disparity also illustrates the scarcity of housing subsidies.
Unlike AFDC, housing programs are subject to funding caps; they
are not entitlements, 95 their supply is inelastic, and their waiting
lists are either long or closed.96 Since recipients have difficulty sur-
viving unassisted in the private housing market, a position on a
waiting list is critical for any welfare recipient.
Therefore, how the federal government allows housing authori-
ties to manipulate their waiting lists is particularly important for
anyone hoping to use flexible subsidies to move into whatever he
or she deems to be a more desirable housing location. For the mo-
ment, mobility strategies and housing programs linked with sup-
portive services are limited primarily to current public housing
residents.97 Even though housing certificates and vouchers not
93. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 50, at 409.
94. See 59 Fed. Reg. 36663 (1994) (fewer than 5% of all Section 8 and public hous-
ing tenants have income greater than 50% of area median, i.e., are "low income" as
opposed to "very low income"; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 36662 (1994) (summarizing statu-
torily set income boundaries for the certificate and voucher programs-participants in
the voucher program must fit below "very low income;" participants in Section 8 cer-
tificate program may be "low income").
95. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 36663 (1994) (emphasizing that housing programs are
not entitlement programs and cannot assist every eligible family).
96. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOME-
LESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1994, A 30-CiTy SURVEY 72 (1994) (stating that sev-
enteen of thirty cities surveyed have closed their waiting lists for at least one assisted
housing program; wait for public housing ranges from three months to sixty months;
wait for vouchers rangers from 3.5 months to 96 months; for section 8 certificates,
from 4.5 months to 96 months).
97. See, e.g., MARY DAVIS, The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, in Hous-
ING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 245 (G. Thomas Kingsley and Margery
Austin Turner eds., 1993) (hereinafter Gautreaux Assisted Housing) (describing eligi-
bility for certificate under the 1981 Gautreaux consent decree as limited to past or
present tenants of Chicago Public Housing Authority public housing, and to persons
on the waiting list before June 16, 1981); 24 C.F.R. §§ 962.103, 984.103 (1994) (defin-
ing "eligible families" for participation in the Family Self Sufficiency Program as cur-
rent residents of public housing or holders of certificates/vouchers). Participation in
the MTO demonstration also was limited to residents in public housing or in project-
based Section 8 housing. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY AND THE PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR THE MOV-
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connected to any special mobility program are "portable" within a
limited geographical area,98 obviously an applicant must qualify
from the waiting list with the home-base housing authority.
Housing authorities must devote 50% of their public housing va-
cancies,99 and 90% of their tenant-based subsidies,1°° to applicants
on the waiting list who fall into any of the three major categories of
"federal preference:" persons in sub-standard housing (into which
category homelessness and living in a shelter are statutorily de-
fined), involuntarily displaced persons, and persons paying more
than half of their income for rent.101 Regulations amplify "involun-
tarily displaced" to include displacement by domestic violence,0 2
an important recognition of a special need for geographical flexibil-
ity even as states undermine that flexibility through the imposition
of differential welfare benefits.
Those falling within the federal preferences category are argua-
bly those most desperate for housing subsidies. There is room
under the federal regulations for "ranking preferences," with which
housing authorities may rank among federal preference holders,
and for "local preferences. "103 A public housing authority's discre-
tion in ranking its local preference category poses the greatest ob-
stacle to poor persons seeking to move out of poverty.
Specifically, housing authorities may use residency as a local
preference. °4 "Residence" includes working in, or being hired to
ING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION FOR FY 1993, [hereinaf-
ter, MTO NOFA] 58 Fed. Reg. 43458, 43460 (1993).
98. 102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing use of a
housing certificate or voucher anywhere within the state, or within the same or contig-
uous metropolitan statistical area as that containing the base housing authority).
99. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 112, 106 Stat. 3689 (1992) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) from seventy to fifty percent).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 36686
(1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.§ 982.207(b)(1)).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (preferences for public
housing); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (preferences for tenant-based subsi-
dies). For a description of the federal preference system, see Stanley Herr and Ste-
phen Pincus, A Way to Go Home: Supportive Housing and Housing Assistance
Preferences for the Homeless, 23 STETSON L.REv. 345 (1994).
102. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.211 (b)(4) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36688 (1994) (for the
certificate and voucher programs).
103. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(a)(3) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36686 (1994).
104. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.208(0, 59 Fed. Reg. 36671 (1994) (allowing a local or rank-
ing preference for residents within the housing authority's jurisdiction for the certifi-
cate and voucher programs); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d)(3) (1994) (allowing use of
residence as a local preference for admission to public housing programs).
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work in, the jurisdiction.10 5 Historically, housing authorities have
used their option for preferential treatment for persons already re-
siding within the jurisdiction as a screen against in-migration of mi-
nority tenants. 1°6
Housing authorities may already use a local preference to screen
for higher income applicants for public housing admission and are
indeed required to vary those admissions by income; 10 7 they may
not do so for the certificate and voucher programs. 08 Recently fi-
nalized preference regulations demonstrate that housing authori-
ties may use their local preferences to select applicants who are
employed. 0 9 The New York City Housing Authority has already
announced its intention to devote its full allotment of local prefer-
ences for public housing to families with working members. 10
Even if no discriminatory screening is used, the simple operation of
local preferences may allow housing authorities to select from their
105. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. Sec 982.208(d) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36687 (1994) (employ-
ment within the jurisdiction to be considered as residence for purposes of the local
residency preference).
106. See PHILIP TEGELER, MICHAEL HANLEY, AND JUDITH LIBEN, TRANSFORMING
SECTION 8 INTO A REGIONAL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 9 (Oct. 1994) (citing
residency preferences as most significant impediment to mobility of minority tenants);
PETERSON AND WILLIAMS supra note 7 at 15; Fred Freiberg, Promoting Residential
Integration: The Role of Private Fair Housing Groups, in HOUSING MARKETS AND
RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 219, 228 (G. Thomas Kingsley and Margery A. Turner eds.,
1993) (describing white suburb of Milwaukee which used residency preferences to
exclude black applicants from gaining access to any form of subsidized housing). See
also Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1994) (summarizing plaintiffs' claim
that housing authority uses residency preferences to prevent the movement of minori-
ties to the suburbs).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iv) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring the pub-
lic housing agency to employ waiting list selection criteria which will ensure the inclu-
sion within public housing of families ". . . with a broad range of incomes. . . "); 24
C.F.R. § 960.211(d) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36657 (1994).
108. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.210(b)(3)(iv) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36687 (1994).
109. See 60 Fed. Reg. 3646 (1995) (announcing amendment of the U.S. Housing
Act of 1937 to allow local preferences during fiscal year 1995 for families with em-
ployed members); S. REP. No. 311, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1994) (amending the
United States Housing Act of 1937 to add to the public housing and certificate prefer-
ence sections, Sections 6 and 8, "(V) assisting families that include one or more adult
members who are employed" [to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (ii)(V),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(4)(A)(ii)(V)]). See also 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(a)(1994), 59
Fed. Reg. 36656 (1994) (allowing use of employment as a local or ranking preference
for public housing admission); 24 CFR § 982.210(b)(iv) (1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 36687
(1994) (allowance of of ranking preference for working families for voucher/certifi-
cate programs).
110. See Shawn G. Kennedy, Housing Projects to Give Priority to the Employed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995, at Al. (describing New York City Housing Authority's in-
tention to give working families preference for up to 50%. of public housing
vacancies).
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waiting lists for the very characteristics that poor people have been
denied the mobility to achieve: employment, income and residency
in a more desirable place.
B. Mobility Strategies-The Problems of "Unassisted" Mobility
The original "mobility" strategies, the use of tenant-based subsi-
dies to move individuals out of concentrations of poverty and race,
share three characteristics. First, they emerge as particular reme-
dies in litigation, and thus are not subject to any standardized na-
tional norms."' Second, they share the specific goal of remedying
concentration by race,112 and third, they include housing counseling
components. 113 The Moving to Opportunity ("MTO") program
differs somewhat in approach, but shares many of the same charac-
teristics. While the MTO program directs its participants' housing
search toward areas of low concentration of poverty, rather than of
low concentration of race,114 it still emphasizes individualized hous-
ing counseling, placement and follow-up."1
5
The design of all housing mobility programs recognizes that ac-
tive assistance in expanding prospective tenants' geographical
choices is critical to fulfilling the goals of mobility. Unless they
receive advice in the apartment-hunting process, certificate or
voucher holders who live in areas hyper-segregated by race or class
tend to stay in them. Factors inherent in, and external to, housing
administration conspire to produce this result.
ill. See PETERSON AND WILLIAMS, supra note 7 at 21.
112. See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1 URBAN POLICY
BRIEF 5 (1994) (comparing racial de-segregation emphasis of the Gautreaux mobility
program with the anti-poverty agenda of the national demonstration "Moving to Op-
portunity" program).
113. See, e.g., Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, supra note 100 at 243, 246
(describing counseling components of present Gautreaux program as including assist-
ance in locating housing, approaching landlords, and-reviewing housekeeping prac-
tices and credit histories to guarantee easier accommodation with landlords).
114. See MTO NOFA, 58 Fed. Reg. 43458-9 (1993).
115. Id. at 43465-6 (describing how non-profit organizations, the primary service
providers under the MTO program, must be prepared to recruit landlords, to perform
credit and house-keeping checks on MTO participant families, to drive families to
low-poverty census tracts to familiarize them with the neighborhoods and show them
rental units, and to provide on-going counseling once families have moved); JUDITH
D. FEINS, MARY JOEL HOLIN, ANTONY A. PHIPPS, MTO - MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY
FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL [hereinafter,
"MTO Manual"] at 10-4 to 10-8 (July 1994) (elaborating on NOFA instructions con-
cerning home visits to check housekeeping and obtain information for credit checks
and to ascertain families' goals); id. at 11-9 to 11-13 (describing ways in which coun-
seling organizations can assist families in their housing searches).
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The regulations governing "portability," the feature of geograph-
ical mobility basic to all tenant-based subsidies, extol but provide
little real incentive for housing authorities to promote it. Housing
authorities are encouraged, but not required, to ease mobility by
cooperating with other housing authorities." 6 Housing authorities
with voucher programs must accept tenants with vouchers from an-
other program.117 But while the "sending" housing authority will
keep funding for the moving tenant's voucher under its Annual
Contributions Contract with HUD, it must reimburse the "receiv-
ing" housing authority for 80% of its own administrative fee." 8
Housing authorities may also suffer loss of some of their local pref-
erence allocation by sending tenants who are subsidized without
benefit of a federal preference. 119
Historically, housing authorities have shown passive recalci-
trance in informing tenants of the availability of mobility options.
Certificate holders are supposed to be briefed as to the "full range
of neighborhoods" available for their housing search.' 20 Despite
the eligibility of public housing tenants for federal preferences for
tenant-based subsidies,'12 1 housing authorities allegedly misinform
tenants of that option and discourage them from applying.1
22
Faced with these many passive barriers to mobility, tenants in
neighborhoods hyper-segregated by race or class are unlikely to
move out of them. The final reason for immobility is historical.
One of the many vestiges of residential segregation is the depriva-
tion of information about housing opportunities outside the neigh-
borhood. The lack of information hinders subsidy holders in the
housing search, and contributes to any reluctance to move. Several
116. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.103(c)(3,4) (1994) (encouraging inter-public housing au-
thority cooperation for mobility for Section 8 certificate holders); 24 C.F.R.
§ 887.555(a) (1994) (suggesting regional cooperation for the voucher program).
117. 24 C.F.R. § 887.565(a) (1994).
118. 24 C.F.R. § 887.563(e-f) (1994).
119. A public housing authority that sends a family not qualified under a federal
preference will have that family count against its annual 10% local preference limit
for certificate and voucher holders, while the receiving public housing authority will
not be similarly penalized. 59 Fed. Reg. 36686 (1994) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R.§ 982.207 (b)(3).
120. 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(c)(3) (1994).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (forbidding denial of
tenant-based assistance to persons qualified for a federal preference solely because of
their status as residents in public housing).
122. See Thompson v. HUD, Civ. Action No. 95-309, Complaint at 32 (D.Md.
1995) (alleging that public housing residents are discouraged from applying for ten-
ant-based subsidies).
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commentators have described this phenomenon.123 It is clear that,
without active intervention in the process of the housing search,
mobility strategies will be frustrated by the very forces that they
are designed to overcome.
IV. Conclusion
When asked at her first orientation session to describe her feel-
ings about being enrolled in the MTO program, one participant
commented on the images of violent opposition broadcast in televi-
sion coverage of community meetings. She noted the intensity of
the expressions of hatred for people like her, based solely on as-
sumptions drawn about characteristics of people who live in the
city. When she moved into a suburban county, she planned to
show her new neighbors that the real issue was "not where you
live, but how you live.' '12
4
The issue is, indeed, whether the "how" is determined by the
"where". Poor people have become strangers in their own homes,
disowned as fellow citizens of the polity by their own neighbors;
how much more, then, are they to be discounted and distrusted
when they cross boundaries expressed in terms of geography but
created by forces of race and class. Against these trends, housing
mobility strategies stand almost deserted, as lonely remnants of a
policy of concern for the poorest of the poor, and of a philosophy
based on mobility as a source of hope, not fear. New welfare and
housing policies use triage as an excuse to target women such as
the participant in the MTO orientation, whose initiative in break-
ing barriers threatens the social order. The successful resurgence of
such policies shows that moving targets may be the easiest ones to
hit.
123. See PETERSON AND WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 18-19; Gautreaux Assisted
Housing, supra note 100 at 249); Rubinowitz, supra note 88 at 621 (1992) (describing
initial responses to Gautreaux program as adverse to the idea of moving away from
familiar neighborhoods).
124. Orientation session for Moving to Opportunity Participants, Offices of the
Community Assistance Network, Baltimore, Maryland (Dec. 7, 1994) (notes on file
with author).
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